



Directorate of
Intelligence


Secret

25X1

Greece's New Democracy Party: The Old Guard Fades

25X1

An Intelligence Assessment



State Dept. review completed

DIA review
completed.

Secret

EUR 83-10233
October 1983

Copy 274

Page Denied



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Secret

25X1

Greece's New Democracy Party: The Old Guard Fades

25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [redacted]
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
the Directorate of Operations. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Iberia-Aegean Branch, EURA,
[redacted]

25X1

Secret

*EUR 83-10233
October 1983*

Secret

25X1

**Greece's New Democracy Party:
The Old Guard Fades**

25X1

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 1 September 1983
was used in this report.*

We believe Greece's conservative New Democracy party—the main locus of political opposition to Andreas Papandreou's ruling Socialists and the principal exponent of Western interests in the country—is in serious straits. New Democracy has been largely unable to regroup since its stunning defeat in the 1981 national elections. In our judgment, the party would have little chance of regaining the popular mandate it enjoyed between 1974 and 1981 if an election were held today. Reversing New Democracy's slide will require such an effort that in the short term the party's chances of catching the Socialists will depend more on Papandreou's performance than on its own.

25X1

New Democracy's political weakness is, in our view, largely of its own making. The most visible problem is a longstanding struggle for the leadership of the party between party leader Evangelos Averof and former premier George Rallis. Their feud preoccupied the Rallis government (in power from May 1980 to November 1981) and has undermined New Democracy's performance in opposition. Underlying the Averof-Rallis split are schisms with subtle ideological and regional overtones, as well as generational tensions between younger party leaders and the old guard—Averof, Rallis, and President Constantine Karamanlis—which has dominated Greek politics for most of the postwar period. The leadership question could come to a head again at the party congress, which could take place as early as next spring, and the result could be the passing of power to a younger leader.

25X1

Factionalism, moreover, has left New Democracy in an organizational shambles. The party began as a rally to support Karamanlis as he worked to piece together civilian rule following seven years of military dictatorship. New Democracy's long tenure in power—1975-81—provided little incentive for building an institutional base of support at the grass-roots level. Instead, the conservatives relied heavily on patronage dispensed from the capital—a tool the party lost following Papandreou's dramatic election victory and takeover of the national bureaucracy.

25X1

Secret

EUR 83-10233
October 1983

Secret

25X1

On balance, New Democracy's long-term outlook probably is not as grim as current circumstances suggest. Even though a change in leadership would be disruptive, a complete rupture in the party during the next year or so is, in our view, only a remote possibility. The natural conservative constituency in Greece remains quite large, and over time New Democracy can probably expect to win back many of the centrist voters who supported the party in the past but opted for Papandreu in the 1981 election

25X1

In the unlikely event that the party's leadership and organizational problems led to its dissolution, New Democracy probably would reemerge in some fashion under the strong tutelage of President Karamanlis. A rump organization bearing Karamanlis's stamp of approval and popular brand of progressive conservatism would face far fewer political hazards to survival than any rightwing or centrist offshoot.

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

Greece's New Democracy Party: The Old Guard Fades

25X1

The conservative New Democracy party has yet to mount a credible opposition to the government of Andreas Papandreou, nearly two years into Papan-dreou's tenure. The party is hobbled by the same problems of leadership, image, and organization that led to its electoral drubbing in 1981 after seven years in power. President and former premier Constantine Karamanlis—New Democracy's founder and elder statesman—may be both the party's greatest strength and its biggest liability. He continues to hold the party together, but his moral dominance may be delaying the fundamental changes the party probably must make before it will be able to make another serious run at power.

Decline and Fall

New Democracy's weakness came into sharp focus in the October 1981 national election. The party received only 36 percent of the popular vote, while Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement won 48 percent and a solid majority of seats in parliament (see figure). The results marked a low point in New Democracy's fortunes. In 1974 the party polled 54 percent of the vote. It won again in 1977 but slipped to 42 percent. New Democracy's defeat also represented one of the worst setbacks suffered by a major conservative party in Greece during the postwar period (see map).

The party's problems had grown increasingly evident in the 18 months leading up to the election. Parliament elected Karamanlis president in May 1980. Whereas this was the culmination of Karamanlis's personal plan for maintaining the greatest influence over Greek affairs over the long term, it did force him to forswear any formal leadership role in New Democracy. The reins of both the party and the government fell to the far less charismatic and popular George Rallis—the Foreign Minister under Karamanlis. Not having come to office as the result of a national election, the Rallis government, in our view, lacked self-confidence from the outset. A cross section of reporting suggests that the public came quickly to

1974-79: A Conservative Resurgence

New Democracy's woes during the year or so before the 1981 election stand in sharp contrast to the party's successes during the previous six years. Greece experienced impressive economic growth and political stability in the latter half of the 1970s, largely because of the leadership of Constantine Karamanlis. The key to New Democracy's success at the ballot box in both 1974 and 1977 was the party's broad platform. Karamanlis staked out a solid claim to the political center right, occupying the ground between the Socialists on the left and the small extremist parties on the far right. Rejecting conventional political labels and the term "conservative," Karamanlis announced at New Democracy's 1979 congress that the party was "radical liberal . . . something between traditional liberalism and democratic socialism."

25X1

25X1


Karamanlis advocated middle-of-the-road policies both to differentiate New Democracy from the discredited extreme right in the aftermath of a military dictatorship and to blunt the growing appeal of the leftists. Karamanlis initiated a national referendum on the monarchy—he took a neutral position—which resulted in a decisive vote against putting the king back on the throne. He brought to trial and jailed the junta ringleaders, legalized the Communist Party, and devised and oversaw the passage of a new Constitution, which has worked well in allocating executive and legislative powers. On the domestic front, New Democracy played an active part in promoting investment and development—half of the economy was state controlled at the time of Papandreou's election—and established social welfare programs. Karamanlis's policy of "Greece belongs with the West" was counterbalanced by an appeal to Greek nationalism that included withdrawal in 1974 from the military wing of NATO, new restrictions on US base rights, and new overtures toward the Soviet Bloc and the Arab world.

25X1

25X1

Secret

Greek National Elections: Share of Popular Votes for Seats in Parliament^a



^a The Greek Parliament contains 300 seats.

^b In the 1974 elections, the Greek Communist Party participated in a "United Left" electoral coalition with eurocommunist parties called the United Democratic Left and the Communist Party of Greece-Interior.

^c The Union of the Democratic Center obtained a small share of the vote and no seats in 1981.

300833 10-83

view Rallis as a caretaker prime minister. Domestic policy shortcomings, Rallis's noncombative style, and Papandreou's strident populism and nationalistic positions on foreign policy put the government on the defensive.

Economic problems also began plaguing the party as rapid growth during the latter 1970s led to high inflation and rising trade deficits. The country's entry into the European Community in January 1981—the consummation of Karamanlis's efforts to strengthen the country's political links with Western Europe—put competitive strains on Greece's nascent industrial sector and boosted consumer prices. The conservatives were blamed for these economic difficulties as well as for the growing inefficiency of the government bureaucracy and the deterioration of the urban environment that had resulted from rapid industrialization and internal migration.

All of this was complicated by internal party tensions, particularly between Rallis and longtime conservative politician Evangelos Averof. Rallis was elected leader

by party deputies with a mere four-vote margin over Averof. The two men long had been colleagues in conservative politics, but the election soured their relationship and exacerbated rather than settled the leadership question.

The intense rivalry between Rallis and Averof led to considerable confusion at the top of the party in efforts to devise campaign tactics to counter Papandreou.

Rallis was, for example, able to win parliamentary approval of a law allowing the political parties to increase the number of candidates on the ballots. The move was designed, we think, to allow

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret



Former party leader George Rallis rows away from the sinking ship of New Democracy in his book "Hours of Responsibility." The recently published book describes Rallis's term as Prime Minister, and it includes scathing criticism of Averof.

gains were more than offset, in our view, by the defection to the Socialists of many centrists who had previously supported New Democracy. In no small part because of this rightward shift of New Democracy's constituency, most of the 26 New Democracy deputies elected to Parliament for the first time in 1981 are, in our estimate, conservatives. 25X1

Soon after the election, New Democracy ousted Rallis and elected Averof party leader—a change which, in our view, has not increased the astuteness of the party's policies. Some policies have simply been ill advised. Unsuccessful efforts to make a partisan issue of the government's alleged negligence earlier this year in investigating the assassination of a conservative newspaper editor stand out in this regard. One stance, the decision late last year to boycott government-sponsored commemorations of the role played by guerrilla fighters—including Communists—during World War II, was out of step with public opinion.

these shortcomings stem equally from a widespread perception in the party that Averof is only a temporary leader and from the maneuvering among his potential successors for the inside track to the top slot.

Who Will Pick Up the Pieces?

In our estimate, leadership is the key to New Democracy's survival. New Democracy is the only contemporary Greek political party to have held together through two changes of leadership, and a third is probably in the offing. We believe that the 72-year-old Averof, who recently underwent heart surgery, is in no condition to lead the party in the election scheduled to take place in November 1985.

A long-overdue party congress, tentatively scheduled for October, probably will be held next spring, and the succession issue could become the focus of deliberations. 25X1

New Democracy to present fresh faces to the electorate and nudge out older candidates. In our opinion, the leadership struggle, however, made it impossible in many locales for the party to put together coherent, attractive candidate lists.

To make matters worse, the one strategy on which Averof and Rallis agreed flew in the face of one of Karamanlis's keys to success: appealing to the center.

Rallis and Averof devoted considerable energy to forming an electoral coalition with the rightwing National Camp party of Spyros Theotokis, which had won 7 percent of the vote in 1977.

Theotokis refused to form a coalition, but he did accept a place on the at-large New Democracy ballot. While New Democracy picked up most of Theotokis's constituency, these

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret



New Democracy hostess of a costume party tells Boutos, Mitsotakis, and Stefanopoulos—all with Averof masks—to "wear something different! You cannot all dress as chiefs!"

Based on previous party caucus votes for a leader and on an analysis of the party's factions, we estimate that the three candidates with the best chances to succeed Averof are parliamentary deputies Constantine Stefanopoulos, Ioannis Boutos, and Constantine Mitsotakis. Each man has good credentials, but each has key weaknesses. Long shots include Miltiadis Evert and Ioannis Varvitsiotis, two younger deputies, and Rallis.

New Democracy deputies could compromise by choosing someone not closely identified with any particular faction. Such candidates are deputy party leader Constantine Papaconstantinou and Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, a former centrist politician and well-regarded former Prime Minister elected to Parliament in 1981 on the at-large New Democracy ballot. The party also could select someone outside the parliamentary delegation, such as former chief of the general staff, retired Gen. Agamemnon Gratsios. All three men are elderly, however, and none would offer more than a temporary solution to the leadership problem.

Whoever ultimately succeeds Averof will need to win the backing of a majority of the party's parliamentary delegation. It is this group, according to New Democracy's bylaws, that will make the decision. As things now stand, we guess that Averof and Stefanopoulos loosely command about 60 of the delegation's 110 members. When Averof steps down, most of these would probably line up behind Stefanopoulos. We estimate that Rallis and Boutos hold joint sway over about 20 deputies. With such a small base, both men presumably could not vie for the top job at the same time. About 15 deputies back Mitsotakis, and the remaining 20 or so are uncommitted.¹

Organization: New Democracy's Nemesis

Such factionalism has undermined New Democracy's organizational machinery. Unlike the Communist and Socialist parties, New Democracy has failed to build an effective grass-roots base. Although this is attributable in part to prolonged incumbency and the strong national appeal of Karamanlis, the underlying cause, in our view, is an enduring pattern of clientelistic politics. Greek parties historically have been dominated by notables, whose local support transcends party identification. New Democracy, in our view, remains more a collection of popular individuals than a modern political party.

Because the party has relied heavily on patronage to maintain its political base, Papandreou's election victory dealt New Democracy a serious blow, particularly on the local level. With the reduction in the number of elected officials and high-level bureaucrats with favors to distribute, local officials had little incentive to continue party functions or generate enthusiastic support from party members. For their part, the few remaining high-level patrons have neglected regional and municipal organizations. According to the US Consul General in Thessaloniki, local New Democracy officials believe themselves to be cut off from party

¹ Appendix A describes the factions in New Democracy's parliamentary delegation, lists the party's deputies, and notes their factional allegiances.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Table 1
New Democracy Factions in Parliament, 1983

Group	Number	Average Age	Average Date of Election	Regional Strength	Ideology	Prominent Supporters
Averof	29	57	1962	Northern Greece	Strongly pro-United States and anti-Communist; pro-EC and NATO; "go slow" on social and economic reform	Papaconstantinou Laskaris Stratos, Tsaldaris Varvitsiotis Kanellopoulos, A.
Stefanopoulos	28	46	1976	Central Greece	Same as Averof but less dogmatic on foreign policy and more pro-private enterprise	(No information)
Rallis/Boutos	17	50	1971	Greater Athens and Peloponnesus	Same as Stefanopoulos on foreign policy, but favor moderate government intervention in social policy	Papaligouras Tzannetakis
Mitsotakis	14	55	1966	Crete	Same as Averof on foreign policy, liberal social policies	(No information)
Uncommitted	22	49	1971			Evert Karamanlis, A. Papaconstantinou, M.

25X1

25X1

headquarters in Athens. As a result, New Democracy was so unprepared for the 1982 fall municipal elections that it had difficulty recruiting candidates willing to campaign against the well-organized leftist parties. [REDACTED]

Organizational difficulties in turn have limited the party's ability to cultivate the broad constituency that previously rallied to the party. For most of its existence, New Democracy has polled rather evenly among voters of all classes and in all regions. The 1981 election results suggest, however, that the party has lost more support in the cities than in the countryside—an ominous development given the country's rapid urbanization. A review of the electoral data shows that New Democracy drew its support disproportionately from the ranks of military officers, businessmen, the Orthodox clergy, and the more prosperous farmers; the party did poorly among those drawn to mass organizations. [REDACTED]

Another manifestation of the party's weak infrastructure is its financial status. Local New Democracy committees rely on headquarters for funds. Headquarters, in turn, appears to depend heavily on contributions from a few wealthy industrialists. [REDACTED]

Attempts to remedy these organizational shortcomings have met with limited success. The first nationwide New Democracy meeting took place in April 1977. The delegates did little more than review statistics showing that New Democracy had 20,000 members in 51 regional and 233 local organizations.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

***New Democracy's Stand on Key Issues:
Sober, Yet Calculating***

New Democracy's current stands on key issues are similar to those it took while in power. Averof generally has labeled Papandreou's confrontational approach toward the West as harmful to Greece's credibility in NATO and the European Community. In recent months, Averof has publicly supported the deployment of new intermediate-range NATO missiles in Western Europe, criticized Papandreou's Balkan Nuclear Free Zone concept, and called for the retention of US military facilities. In a quieter fashion, New Democracy has urged the Socialists to engage in a dialogue with Turkey and support the intercommunal talks on Cyprus.

On domestic issues, Averof has accused the Socialists of trying to politicize the government bureaucracy and create a "one-party" state. He has dismissed "positive steps" such as the introduction of civil marriage as secondary issues. Averof has sided with businessmen in blaming the government for dwindling investment—foreign and domestic—and rising unemployment. New Democracy gave measured support to the retrenchment policies Papandreou unveiled earlier this year, even though it believes they are too limited in scope, and the party believes that the Socialists should ease price controls and allow private enterprise to take the lead again in investment.

On the whole, we believe that New Democracy's positions are more in line with US interests than are those of the Papandreou government. The conservatives find it necessary for reasons of political competition, however, to take strong stands—albeit without Papandreou's acerbity—on issues of national importance. New Democracy is no more willing than the government to countenance a resolution of NATO command and control issues in the Aegean that sacrifices Greek responsibility for the entire area. Nor is New Democracy particularly keen on pushing for a settlement of the Cyprus dispute in the absence of some sort of detente with the Turks.

On relations with countries outside NATO and the Community, New Democracy supports expanded economic and political ties. Although the conservatives have disparaged the likely benefits of the Greek-Soviet economic protocols initialed earlier this year, they, too, see some merit in expanded trade relations with Communist states. The party does not advocate that these economic policies be translated into closer political relations, but New Democracy believes that Greece is best served by keeping a low profile on controversial East-West issues. The lack of Western unanimity on Middle East issues and the importance of Greek trade in the area renders the conservatives nearly as uninhibited as the Socialists in their political support for Arab states.

This gathering was not described by party headquarters as an official convention, and serious work was left for the full party congress—the first of its kind for a non-Communist party in Greece—that convened in 1979. At that gathering the delegates ratified a charter, appointed a 70-member administrative body, and selected a 10-member executive committee. The congress reserved a majority of seats for those not sitting in Parliament, and local organizations were given a greater voice in nominating candidates for

public office. Despite these efforts, the party machinery has, in our view, exerted little leverage over the deputies, who have retained control over selecting the party leader and staffing its regional committees.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Muted Dissent

The slow pace of internal modernization has to date produced little serious grumbling in the party. Until now, organized protest, in our judgment, has been informal, unorganized, restrained, and subtle in effect. As in the case of Papandreou's Socialists, dissent in New Democracy appears to come largely from younger members.³ Unlike their Socialist counterparts, however, the disaffected members of New Democracy have directed their grievances at the party's administrative practices rather than its ideology or policies. [REDACTED]

The principal locus of dissent has been the "Volvi Movement," a relatively obscure group so called because of its emergence in the Volvi region near Thessaloniki. The US Consul General in Thessaloniki reported in the late 1970s that the movement had perhaps 1,000 rank-and-file members, who, in the Consul General's estimate, were primarily college-educated men in their thirties and forties from families where a higher education had not previously been the norm. The group was calling for the reform of traditional politics, the abolition of widespread bribery in public administration, greater opportunities for youth, increased internal democracy, and the decentralization of authority. [REDACTED]

Although there does not appear to be any leadership or structure to this grass-roots movement and although no New Democracy deputy is openly linked to it, press reports [REDACTED] have suggested that Evert is at least a sympathizer. He was leader of the Karamanlis youth group during the early 1960s, and more recently he has been labeled by the press as a leader of an informal group of "new guard" deputies, or "dauphins." Other deputies reportedly associated with the dauphins are 36-year-old Andreas Andrianopoulos, the party's leading representative from Piraeus, and Stavros Dimas and Ioannis Palaiokrasas—younger deputies with positions in New Democracy's "shadow cabinet." [REDACTED]

³ The 1 June 1980 edition of *I Kathimerini*, a pro-New Democracy newspaper and the country's most respected journal, quoted the leader of the party's youth wing in Thessaloniki as criticizing the leadership's "... indifference or, rather, the guardianship, which the party shows to our youth. They consider our youths unripe for initiatives and view us as a useless piece of the party mechanism."

Neither the "Volvi" nor the "dauphins" appear yet to have wielded appreciable influence in party affairs, and New Democracy leaders—hardly sympathetic to all the aims of these younger reformers—have disparaged the Volvi publicly. In our view, the older politicians in the party are well aware, however, of the need to promote mobility within the party. While he was Prime Minister, Karamanlis regularly recruited new members for the party from the burgeoning ranks of technicians and professionals. We believe, however, that such efforts have only scratched the surface of the problem. In our view, unless the party's leaders more actively develop precinct-level organization and abandon their paternalistic approach to the rank and file, New Democracy has little chance of competing with the Socialists' impressive machinery. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Karamanlis: A Godfather Role

New Democracy's cohesion still depends on Karamanlis. The Constitution puts the president above party politics, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] despite his formal retirement from the party leadership, Karamanlis wields significant power within New Democracy and that he is deeply concerned about the party's future—especially the lack of any clear alternative to Averof should he step down. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Karamanlis's deep involvement in the day-to-day workings of the party further complicates the problems of party change and leadership transition. During the Rallis administration, Karamanlis angered the Prime Minister and other cabinet officers by his predilection to interfere in even mundane business. On the eve of the vote of confidence called by Rallis [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

following the 1981 election, Karamanlis's office issued a plea for party unity. This move was widely interpreted in the press—

—as an implicit nod toward Rallis.

Karamanlis's inclination to stay closely involved in the affairs of the party stems from a desire to preserve his political legacy. We believe Karamanlis, who is deeply committed to democracy in Greece, is concerned that the sorry state of New Democracy could jeopardize hard-won political stability. The President's reluctance to leave the work of the party to others is also a function of his personality. As Europe's senior statesman—he served 14 years as premier—Karamanlis has a high opinion of his importance in Greek politics. His self-esteem, which some Greek observers have described as arrogance, has never been tempered by experience in the opposition. Yet another impetus, in our judgment, probably is Karamanlis's conviction that his own popularity is directly tied to that of New Democracy and that a fractured party would make it all the more difficult for him to influence Papandreou.

These considerations notwithstanding, our best guess is that Karamanlis—himself an unexpected and youthful appointee as party leader in 1955—will come eventually to conclude that if the party is to have a future, it must learn to get along without its aging founder. This, we suspect, will lead him to step back gradually from party affairs. We believe that he will be more inclined to do so if he becomes convinced that Papandreou has made his peace with the EC and NATO and is likely to maintain good working ties with the United States. Until Karamanlis does give his successors a bit more room to operate on their own, we believe he runs the risk of stunting the party's development as a political movement independent of his own considerable popularity.

Prospects

Given New Democracy's leadership problems and organizational deficiencies, we question the party's ability in the near term to mount a potent opposition to the government. In addition, Papandreou is still

fairly popular. Although his lack of success in improving the economy would harm the Socialists' chances of equaling their 1981 showing if elections were held any time soon, New Democracy would, in our view, have only a narrow chance of ousting the government. So much needs to be done to rejuvenate the party that its chances of overtaking the Socialists in the short term will depend more on Papandreou's performance than on New Democracy's success in reunifying the conservative movement.

Adding to the party's short-term problems, the selection of a new party leader has a good chance of producing a minor schism. In our estimate, Stefanopoulos's selection as leader would have the best hope of keeping New Democracy intact, but even he is far from universally popular in the party. We judge that Mitsotakis's election would give New Democracy its most dynamic and able orator in a campaign against Papandreou. Mitsotakis, however, has a reputation for opportunistic scheming, and his emergence could impel a sizable number of deputies—20 or 30, perhaps—to break ranks.

In the unlikely event such dissension led to a more serious fracture, the party probably would not completely disappear. President Karamanlis almost certainly would become more actively and openly involved in politics and seek to regroup his supporters in a reconstituted New Democracy. The few right-wing deputies might decide to link up with the extreme conservative Progressive Party of Spyros Markezenis or a reorganized National Camp under Theotokis. Deputies in the Rallis-Boutos and Mitsotakis factions could attempt to forge a new center party, aligning themselves with small parties such as Ioannis Pismazoglou's Party of Democratic Socialism, Ioannis Zigdis's Democratic Center Union, and the Liberal Party. Of these various splinter groups, a rump New Democracy under Karamanlis probably would be the most viable entity. The extreme right would have too narrow a base to pose a threat to the mainline conservatives, while the centrists would face the formidable challenge of competing with Papandreou's Socialists.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Until it solves at least some of its problems, New Democracy will not be able to bring significant influence to bear on the making of national policy. While in a narrow sense this leaves Greece without a real political opposition, it does not mean that Papandreou can pursue his agenda unchallenged. The combination of the pro-Western military and Karamanlis in the presidency will continue to provide strong and clear conservative checks on the Prime Minister's actions.

New Democracy established a generally favorable record as a governing party, and it stands potentially to be the beneficiary of any disgruntlement with Papandreou. Given Greece's strong cultural orientation toward the West and the desire of the Greek public for continued political and economic ties with the West European allies and the United States, conservative parties and their electoral platforms should enjoy enduring support from the Greek public. If New Democracy finds the wherewithal to put its internal affairs in order, this natural conservative constituency should continue to fall its way.

25X1

25X1

Notwithstanding the potential strains, the chances of a wide-open split in New Democracy during the next year or so are, in our view, small. As long as Papandreou retains his strength in Parliament and President Karamanlis remains active in the political arena, prospective conservative renegades will think twice before bolting the party and further weakening opposition forces. Ironically for New Democracy, the danger of a schism could become more acute if Papandreou were to suffer a sharp decline in popularity and encounter serious factionalism in his own party. He might, in this event, seek to lure New Democracy deputies into his ranks with promises of government positions. There also is the possibility that moderate deputies in New Democracy might be tempted to link up with like-minded deputies in Papandreou's party if either of the two major groups in Parliament were to develop extremist tendencies.

25X1

If New Democracy can stay intact and begin dealing with its problems head on, its longer term outlook probably is better than its current political circumstances might suggest. The results of the October 1982 municipal elections show that the party can draw votes without really trying. Although the control of most municipalities shifted to the Socialists, New Democracy was able to match the Socialist vote in Athens and achieve a plurality in Thessaloniki in the first round of voting.⁴ More recently, New Democracy students made substantial gains in university board elections.

25X1

⁴ In both cases, the New Democracy candidates for mayor were young and politically moderate. In addition, a portion of the Communist Party vote—which was almost double its 1981 tally—can be traced to conservative crossovers.

25X1

Secret

Secret

Appendix A

New Democracy's Parliamentary Delegation

Information regarding the allegiances of deputies within New Democracy is sparse and does not permit definitive conclusions about the exact size or nature of each faction. Press [] reports do, however, reveal some broad regional, philosophical, educational, and generational differences. []

The party, in our judgment, falls into two ideological camps, with the supporters of Averof and Stefanopoulos in one group and the followers of Rallis, Boutos, and Mitsotakis in another. Divisions within New Democracy, however, are not sharp, and there are loosely defined subfactions in each of the two groups. A fourth or so of the parliamentary delegation appears to be uncommitted to any candidate. []

The larger of the two blocs—about 60 deputies—backs Averof and Stefanopoulos. Those closest to Averof tend to be the oldest, their ages exceeding the 51-year-old average of all New Democracy deputies. The Averof group includes the highest proportion of deputies who were elected to Parliament before 1974, and its members tend to represent the northern and rural districts in which they were born. Prominent in this group are Karamanlis's "circle of elders," such as fellow septuagenarian and deputy party leader Constantine Papaconstantinou. These are the old guard conservatives, strongly pro-United States and anti-Communist. To a lesser extent they are promonarchist, as well. []

The deputies who support Stefanopoulos tend to be younger than the average age of the party's parliamentary delegation. They are relative newcomers to Parliament and nearly to a man represent electoral districts—most of them in central Greece—of which they are not native. Stefanopoulos shares many of the beliefs of his elders, but he and his followers probably are less doctrinaire in their approach to domestic issues and the Greek left and more attuned to a foreign policy that permits Athens some independence from its Western allies. []

The 20 or so followers of Rallis and Boutos are, in our estimate, a less diverse group, and generational differences are not as pronounced. The deputies in this group are near or below the average age of the delegation and must represent the more urbanized districts of Attiki—the region encompassing Athens—and the Peloponnesus. Even though there are no discernible differences between the two main factions in regard to occupation, the Rallis-Boutos group appears to have a higher proportion of deputies with foreign educations. As the "reformers" within New Democracy, this group espouses the need for social change and moderate domestic and foreign policies. []

Mitsotakis and his approximately 15 backers are philosophically akin to Rallis and Boutos, and they are the party's mainstay in the liberal bastion of Crete. The age span of this group is similar to that of the traditional Averof conservatives. Many served in Parliament before the junta years. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Table 2
New Democracy's Parliamentary Delegation

Deputy	Date of Birth	Age	Birthplace	Election District	Education	Occupation	First Elected	Comments
Averof group								
Averof, Evangelos	1910	72	Trikala	Ioannina	Lausanne University Doctor of Law	Politician	1946	Leader
Anagnostopoulos, Nikos	1929	53	Arkadhia	Athens A	National Metsoveion Polytechnic School University of Milan ^a	Civil Engineer	1963	
Balkos, Athanasios	1916	66	Preveza	Preveza	Military Academy	Army Officer, retired		
Davakis, Dimitrios	1909	73	Lakonia	Lakonia	Athens University	Pharmacist	1951	
Dimas, Stavros	1941	42	Korinthia	Korinthia	Athens University London, N.Y.U.	Attorney Economist	1977	
Efstratiadis, Agamemnon	1926	56	Larisa	Larisa	EMP	Civil Engineer	1977	
Hatzidimitriou, Dimitrios	1918	64	Imathia	Imathia	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1952	
Hatzigakis, Sotirios	1945	37	Trikala	Trikala	Athens University	Attorney	1974	
Hatzinikolaou, Panayiotis	1932	50	Evros	Evros	Athens University (dentist) Thessaloniki University (law)	Dentist	1963	
Kalogiannis, Eleftherios	1930	52	Ioannina	Ioannina EMP	Ioannina Zosimaia	Businessman	1974	
Kanellopoulos, Athanasios	1923	59	Ilia	Ilia	Athens University	Economist Journalist	1963	Former centrist politician
Katsigiannis, Christos	1929	53	Attaki	Attaki	EMP	Civil Engineer	1974	Pro-Rallis?
Kontogiannopolis, Vasilis	1942	40	Ilia	Ilia	Athens and Paris Universities	Attorney	1974	Rallis sympathizer?
Koutras, Panayiotis	1934	48	Thessaloniki	Thessaloniki B	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1977	
Laskaris, Constantinos	1918	64	Athens	Athens B	Athens University	Attorney	1974	Labor leader
Lavrentidis, Isaak	1909	73	Caucasus USSR	Serras	Athens University	Attorney	1946	
Papadopoulos, Haralam	1944	38	Kilkis	Kilkis	Florence Polytechnic Institute	Architect	1974	
Papaconstantinou, Constantine	1907	75	Korinthia	At large	Athens University	Attorney	1946	Deputy leader

Secret

Table 2 (continued)

Deputy	Date of Birth	Age	Birthplace	Election District	Education	Occupation	First Elected	Comments
Rodiou, Georgios	1931	51	Xanthi	Xanthi	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1974	
Simaioforidis, Constantinos	1931	51	Kastoria	Kastoria		Teacher	1981	
Stamatis, Georgios	1915	67	Aitolia-Akarnania	Aitolia-Akarnania	Athens University	Attorney	1946	Pro-Mitsotakis?
Stratos, Christoforos	1924	58	Akhaia	Aitolia-Akarnania	Athens University	Industrialist	1974	
Theoharidis, Dimosthenis	1916	66	Florina	Florina	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1951	
Tsaldaris, Athanasios	1921	61	Athens	Athens B	Athens University (law) Columbia (social science)	Attorney	1963	
Tsiouplakis, Constantinos	1933	49	Khalkidhiki	Khalkidhiki	Thessaloniki Academy Hamburg University Stuttgart Polytechnic	Professor	1974	
Tzitzikostas, Georgios	1941	41	Athens	Thessaloniki B	Thessaloniki University (law) Paris University (economics)	Attorney	1974	Wealthiest person in Parliament
Vagiatis, Ioannis	1916	66	Kozani	Kozani	Supreme Agriculture School Columbia	Farmer	1974	
Varvitsiotis, Ioannis	1933	49	Athens	Athens B	Athens University Freiburg University, West Germany	Attorney	1951	
Vogiatzis, Georgios	1913	69	Evvoia	Evvoia	EMP	Civil Engineer	1946	
Stefanopoulos group								
Stefanopoulos, Constantinos	1926	56	Akhaia	Akhaia	Athens University	Attorney	1964	
Alexiou, Thomas	1925	57	Xanthi	Xanthi	Thessaloniki University (law)	Commercial Agent	1974	
Bletsas, Stylianos	1934	48	Rodopi	Rodopi	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1974	Independent or pro-Rallis?
Damianos, Theodoros	1955	27	Athens	Drama	Advanced School of Economic and Commercial Sciences ^b	Economist	1981	
Frangos, Dimitrios	1935	47	Athens	Attaki	Athens University	Attorney	1974	

Secret

Table 2
New Democracy's Parliamentary Delegation (continued)

Deputy	Date of Birth	Age	Birthplace	Election District	Education	Occupation	First Elected	Comments
Gatsos, Theofilos	1930	52	Arkadia	Pella	Thessaloniki University	Physician	1981	Independent?
Gkoygkourelas, Constantinos	1935	47	Pieria	Piraeus	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1981	
Kalteziotis, Nikolaos	1942	40	Arkadia	Arkadia	EMP	Civil Engineer	1974	Pro-Rallis?
Katsaros, Nikolaos	1937	45	Larisa	Larisa	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1981	
Kratsas, Apostolos	1941	41	Athens	Athens B	EMP	Electrical Engineer	1974	
Manikas, Georgios	1932	50	Fthiotis	Fthiotis		Businessman	1981	
Misailidis, Georgios	1929	53	Khios	Khios	Athens University	Attorney	1981	
Moutzouridis, Georgios	1926	56	Argolis	Argolis	Athens University	Attorney	1981	
Panourgias, Panourgias	1917	65	Athens	Fthiotis	Military Academy	Army officer retired	1974	Pro-Rallis?
Papadimitriou, Eleftherios	1948	34	Arta	Arta	Athens University ASOEE New York University	Attorney Economist	1981	Pro-Rallis?
Papageorgopoulos, Vasilis	1947	35	Thessaloniki	Thessaloniki A	Thessaloniki University	Dentist	1981	
Paparrigopoulos, Constantinos	1922	60	Akhaia	Athens B	Athens University	Attorney	1963	
Polydoras, Byron	1947	35	Ilia	Athens B	Athens University Nevada University Hague Academy	Attorney	1981	
Printzos, Constantinos	1940	42	Magnisia	Magnisia	Athens University	Physician	1977	
Psarouda-Benaki, Anna	1943	39	Athens	At large	Athens University Bonn University (Ph.D.)	Attorney Professor	1981	Pro-Rallis?
Sapsalis, Constantinos	1939	43	Evritania	Athens A	Athens University	Attorney	1974	
Sarlis, Pavlos	1932	50	Piraeus	Piraeus A	Athens University London University	Attorney	1981	
Spentzari, Froso	1942	40	Ilia	Ilia	Athens University	Pharmacist	1981	Pro-Rallis?
Tataridis, Stavros	1942	40	Evros	Evros	Massachusetts University	Economist	1974	

Secret

Secret

Table 2 (continued)

Deputy	Date of Birth	Age	Birthplace	Election District	Education	Occupation	First Elected	Comments
Tsiplakos, Aristeidis	1929	53	Voiotia	Voiotia	EMP	Civil Engineer	1981	
Vlahothanasis, Angelis	1923	59	Evvoia	Evvoia	Athens University	Attorney	1961	Former centrist politician
Vouyioklakis, Elias	1935	47	Lakonia	Piraeus B	Pandeios Supreme School of Political Sciences, Athens University	Attorney	1974	
Vrettakos, Dimitrios	1933	49	Lakonia	Athens B	Athens University	Attorney	1974	Pro-Rallis?
Mitsotakis group								
Mitsotakis, Constantinos	1918	64	Khania	Khania	Athens University	Attorney	1946	Former centrist politician
Alamanis, Stelios	1910	72	Kardhitsa	Kardhitsa	Athens University University of Gettingen	Attorney	1950	Former centrist politician
Kefalogiannis, Emmanuel	1916	66	Rethymon	Iraklion	Athens University ASOEE	Attorney	1950	
Kefalogiannis, Ioannis	1932	51	Rethimni	Rethimni	Athens University	Physician	1958	Pro-Averof?
Kleitos, Nikolaos	1929	53	Serrai	Serrai	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1974	
Mantzoris, Vasilios	1935	47	Arkadia	Arkadia	Athens University	Attorney	1977	
Papadopoulos, Theodoros	1931	51	Serrai	Serrai	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1981	Independent?
Samaris, Antonis	1951	31	Athens	Messinia	Amherst Harvard	Economist	1977	Currently pro-Averof?
Sergakis, Ioannis	1914	68	Lasithi	Lasithi	Athens University	Attorney	1956	Former centrist politician
Sourlas, Georgios	1941	42	Magnisia	Magnisia	Thessaloniki University	Oculist	1981	
Synodinou, Anna	1927	55	Attaki	Athens A	National Theater School	Actress	1974	Pro-Averof?
Taliadouros, Athanasios	1918	64	Kardhitsa	Kardhitsa	Athens University	Attorney	1946	Pro-Averof?
Valtadoros, Angelos	1916	66	Imathia	Imathia	PASPE Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1981	
Vezdrevanis, Elias	1940	42	Thesprotia	Thesprotia	PASPE	Journalist	1981	

Secret

Secret

Table 2
New Democracy's Parliamentary Delegation (continued)

Deputy	Date of Birth	Age	Birthplace	Election District	Education	Occupation	First Elected	Comments
Rallis/Boutos group								
Rallis, George	1918	65	Athens	Athens A	Athens University	Attorney	1950	
Boutos, Ioannis	1925	57	Athens	Messinia	Athens University London School of Economics	Attorney	1950	
Anastopoulos, Nikos	1944	54	Messinia	Messinia	Athens University	Physician	1974	Pro-Stefanopoulos?
Avramidis, Alexandros	1927	55	Athens	Kilkis	ASOEE	Captain, Merchant Marine	1974	
Bekiris, Vasileios	1936	46	Akhaia	Akhaia	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1974	Pro-Stefanopoulos?
Bokovos, Panayiotis	1935	47	Pella	Thessaloniki A	Thessaloniki University Nancy University	Economist	1977	
Fotopoulos, Christos	1928	54	Aitolia-Akarnania	Aitolia-Akarnania	Military Academy	Business Executive	1977	Pro-Averof?
Giatrakos, Constantinos	1936	46	Lakonia	Lakonia	University of Paris Howard MIT	Economist	1974	Former centrist politician
Kalantzakos, Aristeidis	1928	54	Lakonia	Messinia	Athens University Paris University Nancy University	Attorney	1958	Independent? Pro-Averof?
Krikos, Athanassios	1937	55	Fokis	Athens B	Thessaloniki University	Tax Attorney	1974	Independent?
Livanos, Dionysios	1934	48	Athens	Aitolia-Akarnanis	Athens University Oxford University	Attorney	1974	
Moutsios, Georgios	1926	56	Serrai	Thessaloniki A	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1974	
Papaligouras, Anastassios	1948	34	Athens	Korinthia	Athens University Brunell, London	Attorney	1981	Rallis's son-in-law
Papolitis, Sotirios	1941	42	Piraeus	Piraeus A	Athens University Toronto University	Attorney	1974	Former centrist politician
Pavlidis, Aristotelis	1943	39	Dhodhekanisos	Dhodhekanisos	Athens University London Polytechnic	Physicist	1977	Pro-Stefanopoulos?
Souflias, Georgios	1941	42	Larisa	Larisa		Civil Engineer	1974	Pro-Stefanopoulos?
Tzannetakakis, Tzannis	1927	55	Lakonia	Athens A	Naval Academy	Retired Officer	1977	

Secret

Secret

Table 2 (continued)

Deputy	Date of Birth	Age	Birthplace	Election District	Education	Occupation	First Elected	Comments
Uncommitted								
Andrianopoulos, Andreas	1946	36	Piraeus	Piraeus A	Athens University Cambridge University Oslo University	Politician	1974	Pro-Boutos? Rallis?
Bougas, Georgios	1941	41	Piraeus	Piraeus B	Athens University	Attorney	1977	
Ermeidis, Haralampos	1914	68	Turkey	Thessaloniki B	Athens University	Dentist	1961	
Evert, Miltiadis	1939	43	Athens	Athens A	ASOEE	Economist	1974	
Gkelestathis, Nikolaos	1930	52	Fokis	Fokis	Athens University	Attorney	1981	
Gkikas, Sotirios	1925	57	Corfu	Corfu	Military Academy	Army officer retired	1981	
Karamanlis, Achilles	1929	53	Serrai	Serrai	Thessaloniki University Cambridge University	Attorney	1963	President's brother
Kavaratzis, Ioannis	1940	42	Evros	Evros	Athens University	Physician	1974	
Kontaxis, Athanasios	1941	41	Arta	Arta	Athens University	Attorney	1974	
Kopelouzos, Dimitrios	1951	31	Athens	Kikladhes	EMP	Businessman	1981	
Kouvelas, Sotirios	1936	46	Ilia	Thessaloniki A	Thessaloniki University	Civil Engineer	1981	
Manousakis, Diakos	1925	57	Dhodhekanisos	Pella	Athens University	Dentist	1981	
Memetoglou Giasar	1920	62	Rodopi	Rodopi		Journalist	1974	Former centrist ethnic Turk
Nianias, Dimitrios	1923	58	Kikladhes	Lesvos	Athens and Oxford	University Professor	1974	Independent? Pro-Mitsotakis
Palaiokrasas, Ioannis	1934	48	Athens	Kikladhes		Economist		
Papadogionas, Alexandros	1931	51	Arkadia	Athens A	Naval Academy	Naval officer retired	1974	Pro-Monarchist?
Papakonstantinou, Michael	1919	63	Kozani	Kozani	Thessaloniki University Cambridge University Manchester University	Attorney	1961	Former centrist politician
Panagiotopoulos, Georgios	1930	52	Kavala	Kavala	Athens University	Attorney	1974	
Sioufas, Dimitrios	1944	38	Karditsa	Karditsa	Thessaloniki University PASPE	Attorney	1981	

Secret

Secret

Table 2
New Democracy's Parliamentary Delegation (continued)

Deputy	Date of Birth	Age	Birthplace	Election District	Education	Occupation	First Elected	Comments
Sofoulis, Themistoklis	1935	47	Samos	Samos	Athens University London University	Attorney	1981	Pro-Boutos? Rallis?
Stafopoulos Ioannis	1934	48	Athens	Lakonia	Naval Academy	Naval officer retired	1974	Independent? Pro-Averof?
Xarhas, Athanasios	1932	50	Fthiotis	Fthiotis	Athens University	Attorney	1981	Pro-Varvitsiotis?
Elected deputies no longer in the party								
Dervenagas, Athanasios	1941	41	Trikala	Trikala	Thessaloniki University	Attorney	1974	
Kanellopoulos, Panayiotis	1902	80	Akhaia	At large	Athens University Munich University Heidelberg University	Author	1963	Former centrist politician
Kokkebis, Andreas	1909	73		At large	Athens University	Physician	1950	Former centrist politician
Plytas, Georgios	1910	72	Athens	Athens A	ASOEE London	Insurance Broker	1961	
Theotokis, Spyros	1908	74	Corfu	At large	Athens University Paris University Lausanne University	Politician	1934 National Camp party leader	

^a Hereafter referred to as EMP.


^b Hereafter referred to as ASOEE.

25X1

Secret

Page Denied

New Democracy Party Strength by Electoral District



700153 10-83 (A01424)

25X1

Secret

Approved For Release 2008/10/08 : CIA-RDP84S00895R000100070004-9

Secret

Approved For Release 2008/10/08 : CIA-RDP84S00895R000100070004-9